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CASE NOTES
Civil Procedure—Federal Rule 23—Jurisdictional Amount in Class
Actions under Rule 23( b ) ( 3 )—Zahn v. International Paper Co. 1
—Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and some two hundred other
similarly situated owners and lessees of lakefront property on Lake
Champlain, brought a class action under Rule 23 (b) .(3) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure against the International Paper Com-
pany, seeking compensatory and punitive damages totaling $40,000,000
for impairment of their property rights as a result of defendant's
alleged pollution of the lake's waters. 2 Plaintiffs invoked federal juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a),' alleging the requisite diversity of
citizenship and amount in controversy. The defendant, however, chal-
lenged these allegations, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction
over those members of the proposed class whose citizenship was not
diverse to that of the defendant and also over those members who
failed to meet the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (a).
The United States District Court for the District of Vermont
rejected the defendant's first contention, stating that as long as none
of the named plaintiffs in a class action lacks diversity of citizenship
from the defendant, it is not necessary that all of the unnamed plain-
tiffs be of diverse citizenship.' The defendant's second contention,
1
 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.), petition for rehearing denied, 469 F.2d 1040 (2d Cir.
3972), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3357 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1972) (No. 72-888). The
issue raised on the petition for rehearing as to the number of votes required to order a
rehearing en banc is beyond the scope of this casenote.
2
 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d
1033 (2d Cir. 1972). Plaintiffs alleged that the discharge of untreated or inadequately
treated waste from defendant's pulp- and paper-making plant had created a massive
sludge blanket on the bottom of the lake, pieces of which broke off periodically and
washed up on plaintiffs' property, making it unfit for any recreational or other reasonable
use and permanently diminishing its value. Id. at 1034.
8 Section 1332 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between—
(1) citizens of different States 	 . .
28 U.S.C, $ 1332(a)(1) (1970).
4 53 F.R.D. at 430-31, citing Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969), and Su-
preme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921),
In Ben-Hur, the Supreme Court held that where federal jurisdiction is established over
a plaintiff class, the rights of citizens of the defendant's state who are otherwise properly
members of the class will be concluded by the decree in the class action. The Court
reasoned:
[IR the Indiana citizens are not concluded by the decree, and all others in the
class are, this unfortunate situation may result in the determination of the rights
of most of the class by a decree rendered upon a theory which may be repudiated
in another forum as to a part of the same class.
If the federal courts are to have the jurisdiction in class suits to which they
are obviously entitled, the decree when rendered must bind all of the class prop-
erly represented. . . . If the decree is to be effective and conflicting judgments
are to be avoided all of the class must be concluded by the decree.
Id. at 366-67. This argument would seem to be equally compelling where the jurisdictional
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however, was upheld. Chief Judge Leddy found that although each of
the four named plaintiffs had allegedly suffered damages in excess of
$10,000, many of the unnamed plaintiffs clearly did not meet the
jurisdictional amount requirement. Because of the impracticability of
defining a class of only those plaintiffs whose damages exceeded
$10,000, he refused to permit the action to proceed as a class action,
and ordered that reference to all persons other than the four named
plaintiffs be stricken from the complaint!
On appeal,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's order and HELD: where the
claims of the members of a class are separate and distinct, each class
member must independently satisfy the jurisdictional amount require-
ment of $10,000? In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on a
1969 Supreme Court decision, Snyder v. Harris, 8
 which held that
plaintiffs in a class action under Federal Rule 23, as amended in 1966,
could not aggregate their separate and distinct claims, none of which
exceeded $10,000, in order to meet the jurisdictional amount require-
ment of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a).
This note will examine the Zahn decision in light of Snyder and
its antecedents. It will be submitted that Zahn was factually, distin-
guishable from Snyder and that the majority's reliance on Snyder in
the Zahn case was both unnecessary and undesirable. Rather, the note
will argue, in a case where a federal district court has jurisdiction
over one or more plaintiffs in an otherwise properly maintainable
class action, the court can and should extend its ancillary jurisdiction
to those members of the class who fail independently to meet the juris-
deficiency pertains to the amount in controversy rather than to diversity of citizenship.
However, the Court in Snyder chose to treat the jurisdictional amount requirement dif-
ferently, and in fact argued that since under the Ben-Hur doctrine federal jurisdiction
exists where there is only minimal diversity of citizenship, aggregation of claims should
not be allowed because it "could transfer into the federal courts numerous local con-
troversies involving exclusively questions of state law." 394 U.S. at 340.
5 53 F.R.D. at 434. This aspect of the decision is discussed in text at note 64 infra.
0
 Plaintiffs moved for certification of Chief Judge Leddy's order under 28 U.S.C.
1292(b) (1970). Chief Judge Leddy granted this motion and certified the order for
interlocutory appeal. He deemed the controlling question of law to be "whether federal
courts have jurisdiction over all members of an allegedly otherwise proper class, in a
class suit in which the claims of the class members are separate and distinct, if some
members of the class individually meet the jurisdictional requirement as to the amount
in controversy and others, who are not named representatives, do not." 53 F.R.D. at
434. The Second Circuit granted permission to appeal, but Circuit Judge Smith deemed
the question on appeal to be "the novel question whether a diversity case will be allowed
to proceed as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) when the named plaintiffs
meet the jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) but the unnamed
representatives of the class do not." 469 F.2d at 1033. Thus, although in fact some of the
unnamed plaintiffs in this case may have met the jurisdictional amount, the case was
treated as if none of them had.
7 469 F.2d at 1036.
8 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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dictional amount requirement, and should allow the suit to proceed as
a class action in the federal district court.
Historical Background
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted in 1938. Under
Rule 23 as originally enacted,' there were three categories of class ac-
tions: (1) "true" class actions, in which the rights of the class mem-
bers were joint, common or derivative;" (2) "hybrid" class actions,
in which the rights of the class members were several, but there was
a question of fact common to all and related to identifiable prop-
erty;" and (3) "spurious" class actions, in which the rights of the
class members were several, but there was a common question of law
or fact."
In determining whether federal jurisdiction existed, the tradi-
tional rule was that when several plaintiffs united to enforce a single
title or right in which they had a common and undivided interest, it
was sufficient if their interests collectively equaled the jurisdictional
amount. However, when two or more plaintiffs with separate and dis-
tinct claims joined to bring a single suit, the claim of each had to meet
the jurisdictional amount." This aggregation doctrine was originally
enunciated in joinder cases, but was applied to class actions because
"as constituted under original Rule 23 [class actions] were but
procedural devices to permit some to prosecute or defend an action
without the necessity of all appearing as plaintiffs or defendants.""
Thus, in class actions under original Rule 23, aggregation of the
claims of class members in order to meet the jurisdictional require-
9 When promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1938, Rule 23 provided, in pertinent
part:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or
more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of
all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or
against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby
becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting
the several rights and a common relief is sought • . • .
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645, 689
(1938).
10 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice II 23.08, at 2505 (2d ed. 1969).
11 Id.,	 23.09, at 2571.
12 Id., II 23.10, at 2602-03.
18 Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 596 (1916); Troy Bank v. C.A. Whitehead & Co.,
222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911).
14 3B J. Moore, supra note 10, 23.13, at 2957.
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meat was permitted in true class actions, but not in hybrid or spur-
ious class actions."
In 1966, however, the Supreme Court adopted amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which included a revision of
Rule 23." The new Rule 23 abolished the former categories of class
15
 Id. at 2951, 2953. See, e.g., Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15, 17-19
(D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 914 (1949).
16
 The Supreme Court deleted the former Rule 23 and substituted a new rule, which
provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the repre-
sentative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class ac-
tion if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individ-
ual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunc-
tive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members, and that a class action is superior to other available meth-
ods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters
pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B)
the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or un-
desirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action To Be Maintained; No-
tice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions. . . .
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member
that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a
specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include
all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does
not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under sub-
division (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall in-
clude and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class.
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actions, adopting a more practical approach by describing the occa-
sions on which a class action may be maintained." The question then
arose whether the old aggregation rule would continue to apply in
class actions which, under the former Rule 23, would have been
classified as "spurious" class actions.'The Fifth Circuit, in Alvarez v.
Pan American Life Insurance Co., 18 and the Eighth Circuit, in Snyder
v. Harris, 18
 answered this question in the affirmative, while the Tenth
Circuit, in Gas Service Co. v. Coburn," answered the question in the
negative.
In Alvarez, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the new Rule 23
could not have abrogated the aggregation principle, since Rule 82
of the Federal Rules precludes construction of any rule so as to ex-
pand federal jurisdiction." In the Eighth Circuit case, Snyder v.
Harris, the plaintiffs' argument was based on the fact that under the
new Rule 23 a judgment in any class action is binding on the entire
class," whereas under the former Rule 23 a judgment in a "spurious"
class action was binding only on those members of the class named as
parties, to the action." Therefore, plaintiffs argued, since there is no
longer any equivalent of the "spurious" class action, aggregation should
now be allowed in all class actions." The district court, however, did
not agree that it followed from changes in Rule 23 that the aggregation
doctrine should no longer be applied to class actions. The court noted
that the class action under the old Rule 23 was "but a procedural
device to allow several plaintiffs to unite in a single suit," and ob-
served that the new Rule 23 "contains nothing to indicate that it has
now become something more than `[that]."" Moreover, the court
felt that a construction of the new rule that would confer jurisdiction
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or
describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was di-
rected, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds
to be members of the class. .
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 383 U.S.
1029, 1047-49 (1966).
17 Advisory Committee's Note to Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 98,
99 (1966).
18 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
19 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968), aff'd, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
20 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969).
21 375 F.2d at 995-96. The court cited Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583
(1939), a joinder of parties case, wherein the Supreme Court directed the district court
to dismiss the case as to all plaintiffs except the one who met the jurisdictional amount
requirement. See discussion in note 79 infra.
22 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (3), quoted in note 16 supra.
23 C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts 72, at 310 (2d ed. 1970);
Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.RD. 169, 175 (1970).
24 268 F. Supp. 701, 702 (ED. Mo. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir.
1968), aff'd, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
25 268 F. Supp. at 704.
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where no jurisdiction had existed in a similar situation before the
amendment of the rule would be in direct violation of Rule 82, which
prohibits the rules from expanding the jurisdiction of the federal
district courts.' The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the
district court's opinion and the decision in Alvarez.'
In Coburn, on the other hand, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that
one of the goals underlying new Rule 23, that of eliminating the defi-
nitional problems which existed under the old rule, would be frus-
trated if the former classifications were perpetuated in order to
determine whether aggregation would be allowed. The court therefore
defined the question as whether aggregation should be allowed under
any circumstances." It then answered this question in the affirmative,
citing Gibbs v. Buck, a class action brought before the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure became effective, wherein the Supreme Court held
that federal jurisdiction is established where the matter in contro-
versy for any class member who is a party, or for the aggregate of
all class members, is of the value of the jurisdictional amount." There-
fore, the Coburn court held, the plaintiffs could aggregate their claims
and thus satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Snyder v. Harris and
Gas Service Co. v. Coburn in order to resolve the conflict between the
circuits." In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the aggregation rule
was still applicable in class actions involving separate and distinct
Claims of less than the jurisdictional amount, thus affirming Snyder
and reversing Coburn. The Court found that the doctrine that separate
and distinct claims could not be aggregated was not based on the cate-
gories of old Rule 23 or on any rule of procedure, but rather on the
Court's own interpretation of the statutory phrase "matter in con-
troversy" in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) as precluding aggregation.m The
Court also argued that any change in the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure that purported to effect such a change in the definition of
"matter in controversy" would clearly conflict with the command -
of Rule 82 that " [t] hese rules shall not be construed to extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts . . . ." 32
On these grounds, the Court concluded that the adoption of
amended Rule 23 did not change the interpretation of "matter in
controversy" so as to allow aggregation of separate and distinct
20 Id.
27 390 F.2d at 205.
28 389 F.2d at 834.
29 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939). This class action was brought under former Equity Rule
38. However, since the class members had a common and undivided interest in the matter
in controversy, id. at 74, it would have been deemed a "true" class action under Federal
Rule 23.
SO 394 U.S. 332, 334 (1969).
81 Id. at 336.
32 Id. at 337.
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claims in class actions.' The Court also refused to overrule its own
established statutory interpretation of "matter in controversy."" In
the first place, the Court believed that successive congressional amend-
ments raising the amount in controversy without changing its juris-
dictional effect implied legislative approval of the Court's earlier
determination that "matter in controversy" precluded aggregation, and
that in fact the legislature had taken this interpretation into account
in determining the extent to which the jurisdictional amount should
be raised:" Secondly, the Court reasoned that a change in the doc-
trine of aggregation as applied to class action cases would seriously
undercut the purpose of the jurisdictional requirement by considerably
expanding the federal caseload and, in particular, by giving the federal
courts jurisdiction over state claims which could more appropriately
be tried in state courts."
In Snyder, however, none of the plaintiffs met the jurisdictional
amount requirement of $10,000. Therefore, it is submitted, Snyder
should not have controlled the jurisdictional question raised by Zahn
v. International Paper Co.,87 in which the four named plaintiffs in the
class action did meet the jurisdictional requirement although unnamed
plaintiffs did not. However, in Zahn, both the District Court for Ver-
mont" and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit" read Snyder
as compelling a dismissal of the action as to all of the plaintiffs who
did not meet the $10,000 requirement. In applying the Snyder deci-
sion, the Second Circuit noted that although Snyder "does not squarely
hold that every unnamed member of a proposed spurious class must
individually satisfy the jurisdictional amount," there is "persuasive
internal evidence" that the Supreme Court intended this result."
83
 Id. at 338.
84 Id.
85
 Id. at 339.
80
 Id. at 339-41.
87 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972). This was the
first case since Snyder to deal specifically with this question. But several courts of appeals,
without referring to the point, have assumed either that all class members must meet the
jurisdictional amount (see, e.g., Dierks v. Thompson, 414 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1969)) or
that only one member of the class must do so (see, e.g., Lonnquist v. J.C. Penney Co.,
421 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1970)). Lesch v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.R., 279 F. Supp.
908 (N.D. Ill. 1968), is a pre-Snyder case which reaches a result contrary to Zahn. City of
Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1971), was decided after the
district court decision in Zahn, although before the Second Circuit decision. Inglewood
held that each plaintiff in a class action which would have been deemed "spurious" under
the old Rule 23 must meet the jurisdictional amount requirement, citing Snyder and the
Zahn district court opinion. However, the Inglewood court would dismiss individual
plaintiffs from a class action as it became evident that they could not meet the jurisdic-
tional amount, rather than dismiss the entire class action. Id. at 952-54.
38 53 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D. Vt. 1971).
39 469 F.2d at 1034.
40 Id. at 1034-35. In particular, the Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
in Snyder relied on Clark v. Paul Cray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939), discussed in note 79
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The Snyder Decision -
Any evaluation of the decision in Zahn v. International Paper Co.
must start with a critique of the decision in Snyder v. Harris, upon
which the Zahn court relied so heavily. This decision was criticized
in a strong, well-reasoned dissenting opinion, and was received with
disapproval by some authorities in the field of civil procedure." The
principal objections to the Snyder decision are: (1) that it reestab-
lished the "artificial, awkward and unworkable distinctions between
`joint,' `common,' and 'several' claims and between `true,' `hybrid,' and
`spurious' class actions which the amendment of Rule 23 sought to
terminate";" and (2) that it ignored one of the fundamental pur-
poses of Rule 23, to provide a means of vindicating claims which are
too small to justify individual legal action, but which are of signifi-
cant size taken as a group."
Some criticism stemmed from the fact, admitted by the majority
in Snyder, that the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 replaced the old
categories of "true," "hybrid" and ,"spurious" classes with a func-
tional approach to the maintenance of class actions." Under the new
rule, the focus is on the suitability of the particular claim for resolu-
tion in a class action rather than on th'e character of the right asserted."
infra, in which one of the named plaintiffs met the jurisdictional amount requirement, and
cited with approval the Fifth Circuit's decision in Alvarez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 375
F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967), in which one member of the proposed class, albeit not a named
member, met the requirement.
41 See, e.g., Kaplan, A Prefatory Note [to Symposium on Class Actions], 10 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 497 (1969); Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation. of Claims for
Achievement of Jurisdictional Amount, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 601, 604-06 n.I7
(1969).
A proposed Class Action Jurisdiction Act, S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), was
introduced in Congress shortly after the Supreme Court decision in Snyder. This bill
was designed in part to upset the holding in Snyder by giving the federal district courts
jurisdiction over all consumer class actions, regardless of citizenship of parties or amount
in controversy, where interstate commerce is affected. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action
—Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L. Rev. 407, 494 (1969). The bill went
to the Senate Judiciary Committee and was then up for hearing in the Senate. However,
no action was taken on the bill, and it has not yet been reintroduced.
42 Snyder, 394 U.S. at 343 (dissenting opinion).
48 Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 501, 504-08 (1969), citing Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731,
733 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965), and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391
F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968). See Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1970);
Kaplan, supra note 41, at 497; Bangs, supra note 41, at 611. The Supreme Court in
Snyder alluded to the policies underlying Rule 23 in passing, but did not seem to find
them significant in the balance. 394 U.S. at 338. The Second Circuit in Zahn recognized
these policies and expressed sympathy with its own prior decision in Eisen, but found
that "the policies underlying the amended rule are not determinative of this case. Rather
it is clear in the light of Snyder, 394 U.S. at 336 . , that the critical focus in resolving
the issue before us must be on 28 U.S.C. § 1332." 469 F.2d at 1035 (footnote omitted).
44 Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335.




Accordingly, it is argued, once it has been decided that an action is
suitable for maintenance as a class action, it should be the claim of the
whole class rather than the individual claims of the separate members
of the class which is the "matter in controversy.""
That the "matter in controversy" encompasses the claim, of the
entire class logically follows from provision (c) (3) of the new Rule
23.47 Under the old Rule 23, "spurious" class actions were little more
than permissive joinder devices, in that the decisions did not have
binding effect on those who were not named as parties." However,
section (c) (3) of the new rule provides that any judgment in a class
action will bind all members of the class except those who have ex-
pressly excluded themselves.4° Hence, as one critic has concluded, "each
action is designed to adjudicate the totality of the rights of the mem-
bers of the class. Consequently, the amount in controversy should and
must be determined by the totality of the claims to be adjudicated.
The word 'aggregation' is thus probably a misnomer."g 4
The majority in Snyder refused to accept this interpretation of
"matter in controversy" because of the prohibition in Rule 82 against
the courts expanding by rule their own jurisdiction." However, while
it is true that a rule itself cannot compel, either by its terms or by its
construction, a particular interpretation of a jurisdictional statute, a
new rule does allow the Court to reevaluate its interpretation of the
jurisdictional requirements in the new procedural context established
by the rule." To interpret the fact that Congress has raised the amount
in controversy necessary for federal jurisdiction without changing its
46 394 U.S. at 353 (dissenting opinion).
47 Id.; Wright, supra note 43, at 183; Bangs, supra note 41, at 608. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(c) (3), quoted in note 16 supra.
48 C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 72, at 310 (2d ed. 1970).
49 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), quoted in note 16 supra; Wright, supra note 43, at 177.
50 Bangs, supra note 41, at 613-14.
51 394 U.S. at 337-38. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), which, while delegating rule-making
power to the Supreme Court, expressly provides that the rules "shall not abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right," is also pertinent, although the Court did not mention
this statute. See Comment, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 68 Colum. L. Rev.
1554, 1562-63 (1968).
52 Cf. Bangs, supra note 41, at 605-06 n.17:
The gravamen of a violation of Rule 82 is the expansion of jurisdiction beyond
limits set by statute. Rule 82 does not preclude judicial reshaping of a judicially
developed rule (here the boundaries of "matter in controversy") in comportment
with evolving needs. [As] Mr. Justice Fortas observes, "[mlaking judicial rules
for calculating jurisdictional amount responsive to the new structure of class
actions is not an extension of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, but a
recognition that the procedural framework in which the courts operate has
been changed by a provision having the effect of law." CQuoting Snyder, 394
U.S. at 356 (dissenting opinion).]
Both Bangs and Fortas take the opposite view from the Snyder majority, reasoning
that the Court is "tampering with legislative mandate" in not reevaluating its inter-
pretation. Bangs, supra note 41, at 606 n.17; Snyder, 394 U.S. at 350, 356-59 (dissenting
opinion). See Comment, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, The Supreme Court 1968
Term, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 202, 204 (1969).
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jurisdictional effect as indicating legislative approval of this "settled
interpretation" is erroneous, since "[] he silence of Congress and its
inaction are as consistent with a desire to leave the problem fluid as
they are with an adoption by silence of the rule . . . .""
However, the Court's argument with regard to the policies under-
lying the jurisdictional amount requirement is significant in that some
sort of balance must be struck between the conflicting policies under-
lying Rule 23 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332. According to Mr. Justice Black,
writing for the majority in Snyder, the legislative purpose in succes-
sively raising the jurisdictional amount requirement has been to
restrict the rising caseload of the federal courts, leaving cases in-
volving "lesser amounts," and hence usually of lesser significance, to the
state courts." In the abstract, this may be sound policy. However, as
applied to class actions, and in particular to the Snyder case, it is
submitted that this policy argument lacks validity. First, a case in-
volving $10,000 aggregated damages does not involve a "lesser
amount" than a case involving $10,000 damages to a single plaintiff;
and a case involving a claim of $10,000 (or several claims of $10,000
each, as in the Zahn case) plus several small claims certainly does not
involve a "lesser amount" than a case involving one claim of $10,000.
Second, in relegating these class actions to the state courts, the Court
presupposes the existence of a state procedural device under which
plaintiffs could bring their class action as
In view of the policy that a 23(b) (3) class action should
"achieve economies of time, effort, and expense,"" it could of course
be argued that in a situation where the plaintiffs' claims are too
small to allow them to bring individual suits, it would be more "eco-
nomical" to avoid the class action altogether. However, it is more ad-
vantageous to resolve a multiparty controversy in a single sitting than
to conduct separate trials for each plaintiff. Furthermore, Rule 23 (b)
(3) is concerned not only with efficiency and economy, but also with
fairness. The rule itself purports to provide for the "fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy." 57
 It is submitted that dismissal of
the class action in Snyder because the individual claims are too small
to be individual actions is neither fair nor an adjudication of the
88 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946); Snyder, 394 U.S. at 348-50
(dissenting opinion).
84 394 U.S. at 339-40.
88 See Zahn, 469 F.2d at 1040 (dissenting opinion). Even if such a device exists,
absent an applicable long-arm statute plaintiffs will be forced to bring their suit in the
defendant's state in order for the court to have jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. This forum may be less than ideal for those plaintiffs of diverse citizenship
from defendants, since theoretically that forum may be biased in favor of defendants,
its own citizens.
150 Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 17, at 102.
07 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis 'added).
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controversy." If the small claimant in a class action has legitimate
grievances, he should not be foreclosed from any remedy.
The Zahn Decision
In view of the criticism with which the Snyder decision was met,
it is surprising that, when Zahn came before it, the Second Circuit felt
that the decision in Snyder should be extended beyond its own facts."
In reality, Zahn is not an aggregation case at all, since the plaintiffs did
not need to add together their claims in order to satisfy the jurisdic-
tional amount. Rather, each of the four named plaintiffs satisfactorily
pleaded federal jurisdiction without reference to any of his co-plain-
tiffs. On its facts, then, Zahn is readily distinguishable from Snyder so
Moreover, the policies which the Snyder majority felt compelled
the outcome in Snyder are inapplicable in Zahn. Since the federal dis-
trict court has jurisdiction over the four named plaintiffs and will have
to adjudicate their claims in any event, the "federal caseload" argu-
ment of Snyder lacks merit." Allowing the unnamed plaintiffs to join
their claims and be heard by the same court would not substantially
increase the burden on the federal courts, as the certification of a Rule
23 (b)(3) class action presupposes predominant questions of law and
fact common to all the claims." Moreover, in terms of overall efficiency,
66
 Cf. Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 539, 546-47 (1969).
66
 Cf. Zahn, 469 F.2d at 1036 (dissenting opinion): "[T]he majority reads the
Supreme Court's decision in Snyder v. Harris .. , for all it might be worth, rather
than for the least it has to be worth."
Kt Cf. johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 261 F. Supp, 905,
907-08 (ND. Ill. 1966). This was a joinder case, where one plaintiff met the jurisdictional
amount requirement and its co-plaintiff did not. Chief Judge Campbell denied defendants'
motion to dismiss the co-plaintiff for lack of jurisdiction, distinguishing this case from
a case where plaintiffs whose individual claims were all less than the jurisdictional
amount aggregated those claims in order to meet the requirement. Accord, General
Research, Inc. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 735 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
01 Cf. Johns-Manville, 261 F. Supp. at 907.
62 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) ; Zahn, 469 F.2d at 1039 (dissenting opinion), it is true
that once defendant's liability is established (if it is), the burden on the court will be
increased to the extent that it must assess the damages suffered by each individual
plaintiff, since their claims are separate and distinct. Id. at 1036. However, where the
plaintiffs' claims arise from the same operative facts, the fact that there are "differences
among the class members [which] bear only on the computation of damages [is] a
factor which, by itself, does not justify dismissal of the class action." Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir. 1968), See Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton,
Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; City of Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 248 F.
Supp. 506, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1965). In Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559,
569 (D. Minn. 1968), the court reasoned:
[T]he situation should be considered and compared to that which would exist
were no class action to be allowed. . . . It seems specious and begging the
question to say that if . . . 500 law suits: were brought into a class so that
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federal jurisdiction over these claims is desirable in order to prevent
duplicative litigation.' Those persons who also have claims in excess
of $10,000 may now initiate their own actions in federal district court.
All members of the proposed class can try to litigate their claims in
state courts. Thus, striking the class action allegations in these cir-
cumstances will increase the judiciary's burden.
When he reluctantly dismissed the action as to all but the four
named plaintiffs, Chief Judge Leddy gave as a ground for his decision
the impracticability of defining, from among the class then before
him, a class whose members had each sustained $10,000 in damages. In
order to determine the bounds of res judicata, each class member would
have to appear to plead or prove amount in controversy. There would
then be no advantage in maintaining a suit as a class action under
Rule 23(b) (3) rather than as a joinder action under Rule 20(a).
Therefore, the judge reasoned, the suit would not be maintainable as
a class action, since Rule 23 (b) (3) requires that a Class action be su-
perior to other available methods of adjudicating the controversy."
This result suggests a difficulty inherent in the rule of Zahn
that each class member must meet the jurisdictional amount require-
ment. This rule precludes utilization of Rule 23(b) (3) in many civil
actions, since both section 1332(a) 68,
 (diversity of citizenship jurisdic-
tion) and section 1331(a)" (federal question jurisdiction) require a
$10,000 amount in controversy. The difficulty with the Zahn rule, then,
is that it compels the conclusion that 23 (b) (3) class actions are limited
to those types of suits for which Congress has granted federal jurisdic-
tion regardless of jurisdictional amount." -
In any event, it is submitted that the Second Circuit could have
interpreted Snyder with more flexibility th.an it did in Zahn. Although
Snyder admittedly precluded the Second Circuit from allowing plain-
tiffs to aggregate their claims in order to meet the jurisdictional amount
requirement, it did not necessarily foreclose the finding of some other
basis of jurisdiction over the proposed class. Circuit Judge Timbers,
dissenting in Zahn, proposed that federal jurisdiction be extended to
proof on the [common issue] need be adduced only once and the result then
becomes binding on all 500, that thereby the common issue . . . no longer pre-
dominates because from a total time standpoint, cumulatively individual damage
proof will take longer.
The net result is an ultimate conservation of judicial resources.
es Zahn, 469 F.2d at 1039 (dissenting opinion); cf. Johns-Manville, 261 F. Supp.
at 907.
64 Zahn, 53 F.R.D. at 433-34.
05 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970). This provision is quoted in part in note 3 supra.
66 Section 1331(a) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
67 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) (civil rights and elective franchise).
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the unnamed members of a class such as that in Zahn via the doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction." Under that doctrine, "if a case is properly
in a federal court, that court has subject matter jurisdiction over the
case or controversy in its entirety and therefore can adjudicate related
claims of ancillary parties who have no independent jurisdictional
grounds."" Once the federal court has jurisdiction of the principal
action, it may decide ancillary matters "regardless of the citizenship of
the parties, the amount in controversy, or any other factors that would
normally determine jurisdiction." 70 The stated purpose behind the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction—"to effectuate judicial economy and
efficiency, to prevent piecemeal litigation of connected claims which
would otherwise result from the limited jurisdiction of the federal
courts, but most importantly, to render more complete justice and
convenience to litigants""—makes the extension of this doctrine to
the Zahn situation extremely appropriate.
In recent years, some federal courts have readily extended ancil-
lary jurisdiction in order "to solve jurisdictional problems, such as
lack of diversity or amount in controversy, which were often attendant
upon utilization of joinder procedures" available under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 78 The courts have recognized that these
joinder provisions "would have limited effect if the same jurisdictional
and venue requirements were to be applied in the case of added
parties as to the action between the original parties," 78 and have ex-
tended the concept of ancillary jurisdiction to cases arising under
these provisions "in an effort to balance federal jurisdictional require-
ments with the liberal provisions of the Rules as to additional
parties!"
The concept has not yet been applied uniformly to all of the
Rules. Thus, it has generally been held that ancillary jurisdiction may
apply to compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a), cross claims
under Rule 13(g), impleader under Rule 14, interpleader under Rule
22, and intervention as of right under Rule 24(a). 75 On the other
hand, ancillary jurisdiction generally is not extended to permissive
68 469 F.2d at 1036 (dissenting opinion),
69 Id. (emphasis added); see C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts
{ 9, at 19 (2d ed. 1970).
70 Wright, supra note 69, $ 9, at 19 (emphasis added).
71 Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp, 338, 348 (D. Minn. 1967). See Johns-
Manville, 261 F. Supp. at 907; Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims
in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1963).
72 Zahn, 469 F.2d at 1036 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added). Although the
decisions in the various jurisdictions and under the various rules have not always been
consistent, the recent trend has been toward increased recognition of the validity of the
doctrine in joinder actions under the Federal Rules. See generally Wright, supra note 69,
§ 9; Fraser, supra note 71.
73 Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. Supp. 363, 370 (ND. Iowa 1959).
74 Id. Sec Wright, supra note 69, § 9, at 20; Fraser, supra note 71, at 27.
75 Wright, supra note 69, § 9, at 21.
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counterclaims under Rule 13 (3) 78
 or permissive intervention under
Rule 24(b) .77
As was the case with the aggregation doctrine, analogies can most
appropriately be drawn between cliss actions under Rule 23 and
joinder of parties under Rule 20(a). There is conflicting authority as
to whether joinder of parties will be allowed in a diversity case where
one co-party meets the jurisdictional requirements and another co-
party, with a claim arising from the 'same operative facts, does not;
but the recent trend seems to be toward allowing joinder in this situ-
ation 78
• In Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., a 1939 Supreme Court decision, the
Court sua sponte raised the question. of jurisdictional amount, found
that of the fourteen appellees only Paul Gray, Inc. had established the
jurisdictional amount with respect to its claim, and dismissed the suit
as to all appellees except Paul Gray, Inc." Thus, although the ques-
tion of ancillary jurisdiction was not as such before the Court, it
would appear that the Supreme Couit, at that time at least, did not
consider the doctrine applicable to that fact situation.
In a more recent decision, however, United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs, the Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff as-
serts both a federal and a state claim deriving from a "common nucleus
of operative fact," such that, considered without regard to their juris-
dictional sufficiency, the plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try
76 Id. Even here there is an exception tot the rule: no independent jurisdictional
grounds are required for a permissive counterclaim if it is in the nature of a set-off
and is used to reduce plaintiff's judgment rather than as a basis for affirmative relief.
Id., § 79, at 351.
77 Id., { 9, at 21.
78 Zahn, 469 F.2d at 1037 (dissenting opinion). Joinder was allowed in, e.g.:
Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Stone v. Stone,
405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); Jacobson v. AtIntic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.
1968) ; Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co.', 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966) ; General
Research, Inc. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 735 (W.D. Mich. 1968);
Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (p. Minn. 1967); Newman v. Freeman,
262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 261 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Wiggs v. City of Tullahoma, 261 F.
Supp. 821 (ED. Tenn. 1966); Morris v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 246 F. Supp. 984 (E.D.
Pa. 1965); and Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore Co., 186 F. Supp. 235 (ED. Mich. 1960).
However, jurisdiction was denied in, e.g.: Hymer v. Chaff, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir.
1969); Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1961); Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 229 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1956); Hackner v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.), cere denied,' 313 U.S. 559 (1941); Rornpe v.
Yablon, 277 F. Supp. 662 (SD.N.Y. 1967); Diana v. Canada Dry Corp., 189 F. Supp.
280 (W.D. Pa. 1960); and Diepen v. Fernow, 1 F.R.D. 378 (W.D. Mich. 1940).
79 306 U.S. 583, 590 (1939). The majority opinions in Zahn and Snyder both cite
Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., characterizing it as a class action. 469 F.2d at 1035; 394 U.S. at
336-37. The dissenting judge in Zahn, however, claimed it was merely a case of permissive
joinder. 469 F.2d at 1039. An examination of the record in the Clark case supports the
dissent's viewpoint. Plaintiffs were five corporations, two partnerships and seven indi-
viduals seeking injunctive relief from the enforcement of a California statute as against
themselves rather than all those similarly situated.
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them in one judicial proceeding, a federal court has adjudicatiVe
power over the state claim by means of pendent jurisdiction." This
concept is a particularized form of ancillary jurisdiction, relating
solely to joinder of federal and state claims." But it has been argued
that, by the same token, a diversity claim should be allowed where
another diversity claim involving the same operative facts has been
properly brought in the federal courts. Thus, in Jacobson v. Atlantic
City Hospital,82 the Third Circuit allowed an executor to bring a mal-
practice suit against a hospital and two physicians, despite the fact
that recovery from the hospital was limited by statute to less than
the jurisdictional amount required, because there was no such limita-
tion with regard to the two co-defendants. Similarly, the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Stone v. Stone allowed a settlor to bring a tort action against
her grandson and her daughter-in-law for misappropriation of trust
funds, although her claim against the grandson was for less than the
jurisdictional amount. In both cases, the courts cited Gibbs as ana-
logical support for their decisions." The Stone court reasoned: "In each
situation {the federal question situation and the diversity situation],
the federal court has before it a claim which clearly satisfies the re-
quirements of § 1331 or § 1332, and in each instance the plaintiff as-
serts an additional claim which, if litigated alone, would not satisfy
a jurisdictional requirement."" The Gibbs rule for federal question
cases ought therefore to be applicable to multi-claim diversity cases as
well."
Similarly, the Gibbs rule has been extended to situations where
multiple plaintiffs sue on separate claims against a single defendant.
Thus, in Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co.," where a father
brought suit on behalf of his minor child for injuries due to defendant's
negligence in the design of a lawn mower, the Third Circuit allowed the
father to join his own claim for damages resulting from the child's
injury with the claim of his son, although the father's claim by it-
self was jurisdictionally insufficient. Citing Gibbs, the court went on
to say that although pendent jurisdiction usually involved one plain-
tiff," it could also apply where there were two plaintiffs with claims
80 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
81 Wright, supra note 69, § 19, at 65; Zahn, 469 F.2d at 1037 (dissenting opinion).
82 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968).
83 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968).
84 392 F.2d at 155; 4.05 F2d at 97.
88 405 F.2d at 97.
88 Id. at 98; Jacobson, 392 F.2d at 155.
87 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966).
88 Note in this regard that unless the defendant, International Paper Co., at the
time of suit had ceased to operate its plant or had lowered its pollution level to an
acceptable standard, the plaintiffs in Zahn could have avoided dismissal of their action
if they had included in their complaint a claim for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2).
In injunction actions the matter in controversy is determined by the value of the right
to be protected or the extent of the injury to be prevented. Wright, supra note 69, § 33,
at 116. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. City of Girard, 210 F.2d 437, 439 (6th Cir. 1954).
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arising from the same occurrence." In a subsequent case, Newman v.
Freeman, it was not deemed significant that the "two plaintiffs" in
Wilson were actually one person suing in different capacities."
In Hatridge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.," the concept of
ancillary jurisdiction was utilized to compel a plaintiff with a claim of
less than $10,000 to appear in federal court. Mrs. Hatridge instituted
an action in a state court to recover on a default judgment for loss of
consortium. Although the amount of the judgment was greater than
$10,000, she sought $9,999.99, waiving her right to recover anything
in excess of this amount. Aetna removed the action to the federal dis-
trict court, whereupon Mrs. Hatridge moved to remand. This motion
was denied by the district court, and the denial of the motion was
affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, with the then Circuit Judge Blackmun
writing the opinion of the court. The court held that, even assuming
Mrs. Hatridge's waiver to be effective, her claim was ancillary to her
husband's pending claim for personal injuries, and that federal juris-
diction over his claim supported federal jurisdiction over hers and in
fact prevented her from separating her claim in order to gain access
In Zahn, both the right of each plaintiff to live in an environment free from excessive
pollution, and the right of the defendant paper company to continue its operation at its
current pollution level, would seem to be of a value greater than $10,000. Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1972); 'cf. Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Ry.,
309 F. Supp. 354, 355 (N.D. Ohio 1969). Having succeeded in asserting federal jurisdic-
tion over their (b) (2) claim for injunctive relief, the same plaintiffs could then have
joined their (b) (3) claim for compensatory and punitive damages, and invoked the
court's ancillary jurisdiction over this claim.
In the future, plaintiffs in a situation similar to the Zahn situation may have the
alternative of bringing suit under § 505(a) (1) (A) of the recently amended Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972), which appears in
modified form at 33 U.S.CA. § 1365 (Supp. 1973). This section provides:
Sec. 505. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any
citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf—
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in viola-
tion of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this Act or (B) an
order issued by the Administrator or alState with respect to such a standard
or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not
discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard
or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such
act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties
under section 309(d) of this Act. . . . (Emphasis added.)
Once jurisdiction has attached under this Act, plaintiffs may append their claim for
damages. This alternative was not available to Zahn and his co-plaintiffs, however,
as the former Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. H 1151-75 (1970), did not
provide for citizen suits.
88 364 F.2d at 564.
00 262 F. Supp. 106, 108 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
81 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969).
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to the state courts. This holding was deemed supported by the Gibbs
doctrine, since the husband's and wife's claims derived from a "com-
mon nucleus of operative fact" and were such that they would ordi-
narily be expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding."
Thus, a strong case has been made in the federal courts for the
application of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in joinder cases
where one or more co-plaintiffs do not have the requisite amount in
controversy. It is submitted that this doctrine should be extended one
step further and applied to those plaintiffs in a class action who fail
to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement, where jurisdiction has
been properly established by the named plaintiffs of the class. Neither
the federal jurisdiction statutes nor the prohibition against aggrega-
tion of separate and distinct claims would be violated by permitting
the entire class to remain in federal court." On the contrary, this ap-
pears to be the most satisfactory method of balancing the policies
behind the jurisdictional statutes with those behind the new Federal
Rule 23.
Conclusion
The Second Circuit's reliance on Snyder v. Harris in its opinion
in Zahn v. International Paper Co. was misplaced and unfortunate.
Zahn is readily distinguishable from Snyder both on its facts and on
the basis of the underlying policy considerations. Application of the
Snyder decision to the facts of Zahn actually undermines the policy of
Snyder in favor of easing the burden on the federal courts. Such ap-
plication in effect results in an increase in the federal caseload as well
as the state caseload, as plaintiffs are forced to bring separate actions
in the federal and state courts rather than uniting in one suit in federal
court. On the other hand, application of the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction in order to allow all plaintiffs in Zahn to join in a single
class action would give effect to the Snyder policy of easing the burden
on the federal courts without violating the traditional aggregation rule
reiterated in Snyder. In addition, application of this doctrine would
afford the small claimant a chance to litigate his legitimate grievances,
where litigation might otherwise be beyond his means.
It is hoped that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in this
case,°4 and define once and for all the limits of the doctrine of ancillaryjurisdiction. By extending this doctrine to allow federal jurisdiction
over the entire class in Zahn, the harsh rule of Snyder v. Harris can
be somewhat mitigated.*
LOUISE A. LERNER
92 Id. at 816.
93 Cf. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 261 F, Supp. 905,
907 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
94 Petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3357 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1972) (No. 72-888).
* After this note went to press, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 41 U.S.L.W. 3447 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1972) (No. 72-888).
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